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FIRST-HIT ANALYSIS OF ALGORITHMS FOR COMPUTING
QUADRATIC IRREGULARITY
JOSHUA HOLDEN
Abstract. The author has previously extended the theory of regular and
irregular primes to the setting of arbitrary totally real number fields. It has
been conjectured that the Bernoulli numbers, or alternatively the values of
the Riemann zeta function at odd negative integers, are evenly distributed
modulo p for every p. This is the basis of a well-known heuristic, given by
Siegel in [17], for estimating the frequency of irregular primes. So far, analyses
have shown that if Q(
√
D) is a real quadratic field, then the values of the
zeta function ζD(1− 2m) = ζQ(
√
D)
(1− 2m) at negative odd integers are also
distributed as expected modulo p for any p. We use this heuristic to predict the
computational time required to find quadratic analogues of irregular primes
with a given order of magnitude. We also discuss alternative ways of collecting
large amounts of data to test the heuristic.
1. Introduction
Let Q(
√
D) be a real quadratic field with D a positive fundamental discriminant.
In several previous papers the author has defined an analogue for the theory of
regular and irregular primes in this setting, based on the following definition:
Definition 1. Let ζD be the zeta function for Q(
√
D), and let δ be equal to p− 1
unless D = p, in which case δ = (p − 1)/2. We say that p is D-regular if p is
relatively prime to ζD(1 − 2m) for all integers m such that 2 ≤ 2m ≤ δ − 2 and
also p is relatively prime to pζD(1 − δ). The number of such zeta-values that are
divisible by p will be the index of D-irregularity of p.
(More generally, we may refer to the concept as “quadratic irregularity”; see [12,
13, 14] for more details and extensions to any totally real number field.)
According to a well-known theorem of Kummer, p divides the order of the class
group of Q(ζp) if and only if p divides the numerator of a Bernoulli number B2m
for some even 2m such that 2 ≤ 2m ≤ p− 3. Such primes are called irregular; the
others are called regular. In [13], building on work of Greenberg and Kudo, the
author proved that in the setting we have described above Kummer’s criterion can
be extended to give information about whether p divides the class number (that is,
the order of the class group) of Q(
√
D, ζp). To be exact, we have:
Theorem 1 (Greenberg, Holden). Assume that p does not divide D. Then p di-
vides the class number of Q(
√
D, ζp) if and only if p is not D-regular.
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The main focus of this paper is in finding large p which are irregular for some
D. This may be useful for cryptography, in that one common way of constructing
public-key cryptographic systems is to utilize the problem of finding a discrete
logarithm in some abelian group. In order to make sure that the discrete logarithm
problem is computationally hard, one needs to know something about the structure
of the group involved, e.g. that it is divisible by a large prime. Theorem 1 shows
that if p is a large D-irregular prime and p does not divide D, then the class group
of Q(
√
D, ζp) may be suitable for cryptography. We will come back to this in
Section 5.
2. Search Algorithms
Suppose, for instance, that we want to find p of a specified size dividing ζD(1− 2m)
for some m such that 2 ≤ 2m ≤ δ − 2 or dividing pζD(1 − δ). (For reasons that
will become clear, we will not encounter the situation D = p in practice, so we may
focus on the case where δ = p− 1. See Section 5 for the details.) More specifically,
we might fix a real number c greater than 1 and then look for m and D such that
P ≤ p ≤ cP and p divides ζD(1 − 2m) for some positive m less than or equal to
(p − 1)/2. (In practice, c = 2 would probably be the most common choice, since
that would be equivalent to specifying the size of p in number of bits.)
The algorithm that we will use to carry out this search is described in [14]. The
algorithms there fall into two basic types. The first type calculates ζD(1 − 2m) in
a range of m for each D before going on to the next D, and calculates each value
in time O(mO(1)D1+o(1)) when amortized over both D and m. The second type
calculates ζD(1 − 2m) in a range of D for each m before going on to the next m.
If one keeps a table of intermediate values as described in Section 3 of [14], this
algorithm can calculate each value in time O(mO(1) L(D)O(1)) when amortized over
both D and m, where L(x) is a subexponential function corresponding to a choice
of factoring routine used in the calculation, e.g. L(x) = ec(log x)
1/3(log log x)2/3 for
the number field sieve. The facts that the amortized times are subpolynomial in D
and that a range of D are calculated for each m suggest using this algorithm.
In fact, one might suppose that one could always use m = 1 and search until an
appropriate D is found without ever going on to the next m. However, one other
factor needs to be taken into account. The size of the numerator of ζD(1 − 2m)
is O(m(lgm + lgD)) bits (see [12]), so ζD(1− 2m) is much more likely to have
large prime factors for large m than for small m. The same issue comes up for D,
of course, but to a lesser degree and in a way which does not greatly affect this
algorithm, since a large number of values of D are used for each m.
To make sure that we can avoid getting stuck in a range where the values of the
numerator of ζD(1− 2m) are too small, we will give our algorithm parameters M1,
D1, and D2 such that we always have m ≥M1 and D1 ≤ D ≤ D2. In Section 3 we
will explain some conjectures which imply that for each pair (D,m), the chance that
each prime between P and cP divides ζD(1− 2m) is approximately 2/P . Given
this, the Prime Number Theorem implies that the chance that some prime between
P and cP divides ζD(1− 2m) is approximately 2(c− 1)/(logP ).
Now if we are trying D1 ≤ D ≤ D2 for each m, we see that the chance that we
find a suitable D for any given m is approximately(
3
pi2
)
2(D2 −D1)(c− 1)
logP
,
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Table 1. Time in minutes to find the first suitable pair (D,m)
with given parameters
c P D2 (D,m) p min.
1.01 105 104 (4156, 2) 100391 27
1.1 105 104 (697, 2) 106681 33
1.6 105 104 (205, 2) 113173 81
2 105 104 (184, 2) 164999 82
2 106 300 (40, 3) 1264807 169
2 106 103 (380, 2) 1017299 191
2 106 104 (380, 2) 1017299 191
2 2 · 106 104 (317, 2) 2027569 569
since the asymptotic density of fundamental discriminants in the integers is 3/pi2.
However, if we consider the typical case c = 2, then we see that we only have to
chooseD2−D1 to be on the order of magnitude of logP for the expected probability
of success on any givenm to be 1! Thus with D2−D1 reasonably large, the expected
time using this strategy is
O
((
logP
c− 1
)
L(D)O(1) + P
)
,
where the added term of P accounts for the time it takes to check whether each p
divides each computed ζD(1− 2m). Table 1 provides some actual timing examples
of this algorithm, running on a Pentium III computer using the Linux operating
system and the GP-Pari interpreted language. (See [2].) In all cases D1 = 5 and
M1 = 2.
3. The Hypotheses: Conjectures and Previous Results
The hypotheses mentioned in Section 2 stem from the conjecture, made (not
very explicitly) by Siegel in [17], that the numerators of the Bernoulli numbers B2m
were evenly distributed modulo p for any odd prime p. Siegel used the conjecture to
derive a conjectural density for the irregular primes. (Lehmer seems to have done
the same thing in [16] but only gives the density.) Siegel’s hypothesis was used more
generally by Johnson ([15]) and independently by Wooldridge ([20, Chap. III]) to
predict the density of primes with a given index of irregularity, that is such that
p divides a given number of the Bernoulli numbers B2, . . . , Bp−3. It also comes in
handy for predicting many other values that are related to irregular primes, such
as the order of magnitude of the first prime of a given index of irregularity. (See,
for example, [18].) Since B2m = −ζ(1 − 2m)(2m), it is equivalent to say that the
values of ζ(1 − 2m) are evenly distributed modulo p, where ζ(s) is the Riemann
zeta function.
Little or no progress has been made on proving Siegel’s hypothesis, but a great
deal of data has been collected, especially in regard to the prediction of Johnson
and Wooldridge. Specifically, this prediction says that as p → ∞, the probability
that p has index of irregularity r goes to(
1
2
)r
e−1/2
r!
.
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(In addition to the original sources, the details may be found in Section 5.3 of [19].)
Note that this prediction does not rely on the full strength of Siegel’s hypothesis,
but merely on the weaker hypothesis that the Bernoulli numbers are 0 modulo p
with probability 1/p. The assumptions made in Section 2 relate only to predictions
about indices of irregularity based on this weaker hypothesis.
Wagstaff, in [18], computed ur(x), the fraction of primes not exceeding x with
index r of irregularity for each r between 0 and 2 and for all r ≥ 3 grouped together,
and compared this distribution to the predicted distribution for each multiple x of
1000 up to 125000. The result of the chi-squared test “fluctuated usually between
0.1 and 1.0 and had the value 0.29 at x = 125000. It was 0.03 at x = 8000”
[18]. These results correspond to significance levels of .992, .801, .962, and .999,
respectively. (The significance levels used in this paper correspond roughly to the
probability that the agreement between the observed results and the predicted
results is not due to chance. Statisticians consider the threshold for considering a
result to be not due to chance to be a significance level of .9 to .95. Since we are
not actually conducting a valid statistical study in this paper, all of the statistical
results should be taken with a very large grain of salt.)
Buhler, Crandall, Ernvall, and Metsa¨nkyla¨ hold the record for computations
with irregular primes, having found all the irregular primes below four million as
described in [7]. They do not seem to have done a chi-squared analysis, but they
tabulate the values of ur(x) for x = 4000000 and r between 0 and 7. A chi-squared
test using the same methodology as before has the result 1.02, for a significance level
of .796. Earlier, in [8], Buhler, Crandall, and Sompolski tabulated the same data
for x = 1000000. The result of the same chi-squared test is 0.78, for a significance
level of .854.
Unfortunately, the only way to collect data to test Siegel’s hypothesis is to in-
vestigate B2m for larger and larger m, which is very computationally intensive.
(See [1] or [10] for details.)
However, in the more general number field case, there are many more dimensions
to the problem. We start by restricting our attention to the case of k an abelian
totally real number field. Then we know that
ζk(s) =
∏
χ∈Gˆ
L(s, χ)
where Gˆ is the character group of G = Gal(k/Q) and L(s, χ) is the L-function
associated with the character χ. Note that L(s, 1) = ζ(s), so the Riemann zeta
function is a factor of the zeta function for k. (See [9], e.g., for more details.)
Certainly it seems likely that for a fixed (totally real) number field k and character
χ the values of the numerator of L(1−2m,χ) are evenly distributed modulo p as m
varies. (It is known that these values are rational numbers.) We also hypothesize
that these values for different χ are independent, which implies that the numerators
of ζk(1− 2m) are distributed modulo p like the product of |G| independent integer
variables, each of which is evenly distributed modulo p. We will refer to this as
the “product distribution”, for lack of a better term. However, it also is reasonable
to conjecture that for a fixed m the values of ζk(1− 2m) are distributed according
to the product distribution modulo p as k varies. More precisely, if we fix m and
the degree of k we expect the values to be distributed according to the product
distribution modulo p as the discriminant of k varies. Alternatively, if we fix m
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and the discriminant of k we expect the values to be distributed according to the
product distribution modulo p as the degree varies.
In this paper we will be considering the former situation. As in the previous
sections, we fix the degree at 2, and let k = Q(
√
D) be a real quadratic field with
zeta function ζD(s). In this case
ζD(s) = L(s, 1)L(s, χ) = ζ(s)L(s, χ)
where χ(s) =
(
D
s
)
, the Kronecker symbol, where appropriate.
In addition to the above definitions we will make one more set:
Definition 2. Let χ be as above and let δ be as in Section 1. We will say that
p is χ-regular if p is relatively prime to L(1 − 2m,χ) for all integers m such that
2 ≤ 2m ≤ δ − 2 and also p is relatively prime to pL(1 − 2m,χ). The number of
such L-values that are divisible by p will be the index of χ-irregularity of p.
Saying that the values of ζk(1 − 2m) are distributed according to the product
distribution and that the values of ζ(1− 2m) are evenly distributed is the same as
saying that the values of L(1 − 2m,χ) are evenly distributed modulo p. Then we
can make the same prediction about the indices of χ-irregularity that Johnson and
Wooldridge made about the indices of irregularity in the rational case. We briefly
investigated this issue in [12], where there are tables of the analogue of ur(x) (using
the index of χ-irregularity) for x = 1000, r from 0 to 4, and D = 5, 8, 12, and 13.
The chi-squared test results are not included, but using the methodology discussed
earlier they are 3.32, 1.74, 1.15, and 2.54. The corresponding significance levels are
.345, .628, .765, and .469, respectively. We could total the values of (the analogue
of) ur(x) for the four values of D and compare them to the predicted values; we
might expect that this would give us a better significance level because of the
larger “sample size”. However, in this case the chi-squared result is 3.53 and the
significance level is .316, which is worse than any of the results for the values of
D taken separately! This may be due to some small second-order bias which is
common to each sample and thus is reinforced when they are pooled together.
4. The Hypotheses: New Results
In the course of testing the algorithms in [14], we collected more data in addition
to that above. Table 2 shows the number of primes less than 5000 which have χ-
index of irregularity r for various values of r and D = 5. We compared the observed
and predicted distributions, using the methodology above, for primes below x where
x was 1000, 2000, 3000, 4000, and 5000, and found chi-squared values of 3.32,
5.03, 2.51, 1.73, and 2.10 and significance levels of .344, .170, .473, .630, and .552,
respectively.
Table 2. Results for D = 5 and p < 5000
r number predicted number predicted fraction
0 422 405.16 .606531
1 186 202.58 .303265
2 51 50.65 .075816
3 7 8.44 .012636
4 2 1.06 .001580
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Other data was obtained using the philosophy, described in Section 2, of com-
puting the values of L(1−2m,χ) for large numbers of D and relatively small values
of m. As in the discussion of D = 5, 8, 12, and 13 above, we present the total across
the different discriminants. Table 3 presents the data for all D < 5000 and p < 100.
The chi-squared value for the totals is 81.1 and the significance level is .000.
Table 3. Results for D < 5000 and p < 100
r total predicted total predicted
number number fraction
0 21864 22068.01 .606531
1 11596 11034.01 .303265
2 2529 2758.50 .075816
3 347 459.75 .012636
4 41 57.47 .001580
5 7 5.75 .000158
However, if we view the data broken down by prime, as in Table 4, we see
that a large part of the contribution to the chi-squared value is from small primes.
The values of p shown in the table were selected with an eye towards showing
both a trend toward smaller chi-squared values as p increases and also some of the
exceptions. We hope to make the nature of the small-prime contribution clearer in
the future.
Table 4. Results for D < 5000; selected values of p
r 0 1 2 ≥ 3 sig. level
pred. 919.50 459.75 114.94 21.81
p = 3 876 640 0 0 .000
p = 5 956 500 60 0 .000
p = 7 895 530 89 2 .000
p = 11 876 497 131 12 .008
p = 13 947 467 91 11 .010
p = 17 950 452 95 19 .175
p = 23 933 462 106 15 .387
p = 37 913 468 108 27 .605
p = 47 911 476 109 20 .775
p = 67 915 466 114 21 .986
p = 79 859 487 144 26 .003
p = 97 909 468 122 17 .623
5. Practical Notes
The hypotheses that p divides ζ(1− 2m) with probability 1/p and that p divides
L(1− 2m,χ) with the same probability clearly imply that p divides ζD(1− 2m) =
ζ(1 − 2m)L(1 − 2m,χ) with probability (2/p) − (1/p2), or approximately 2/p for
very large p, as we claimed in Section 2. Also, for the algorithms in that section
one doesn’t really have to worry about the possibility that δ is not p− 1, since this
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would require D = p. However, we showed that D2 − D1 can be on the order of
magnitude of log p, so the case of D = p can only arise as the result of what can
only be called bad planning.
As mentioned in the introduction, one use for the algorithms of this paper may be
to findD and p such that the class group ofQ(
√
D, ζp) can be used for cryptographic
protocols. In [5], Buchmann and Paulus introduced a one way function based on
class groups of number fields and noted that such a function could be used to
implement Diffie-Hellman key exchanges and ElGamal signature schemes, to take
two examples. These ideas are expanded on in [3], which introduces a signature
scheme called RDSA which is based on taking p-th roots in the class group of a
number field or other abelian group. Here p is a random prime number which (one
assumes) does not divide the order of the group. One advantage of this signature
scheme is that it is unnecessary and in fact undesirable to know precisely the order
of the group, a situation which frequently occurs with class groups and in fact is
generally true for the class groups found with the algorithms above.
Given that the order of the class group is unknown, the question of which class
groups are suitable for these protocols is addressed in [11], which gives two necessary
conditions on the class number:
• The class number must be sufficiently large. This should make it difficult to
determine the class number or discrete logarithms using exhaustive search,
Pollard Rho, Baby-Step-Giant-Step, Hafner-McCurley, or index calculus.
• The class number must have at least one sufficiently large prime divisor. This
should make it difficult to find discrete logarithms using a Pohlig-Hellman
attack.
As we have seen, the algorithms of this paper allow us to find a class number with
a prime divisor as large as desired, and thus with the class number itself as large
as desired.
The drawback is that the amount of time and space needed to carry out the
cryptographic protocols in these groups can also be very large. The papers [5]
and [11] explain how to represent the objects necessary to compute with. Since
elements in the class group are equivalence classes of ideals in a ring of integers,
we need to store a Z-basis for the ring of integers of Q(
√
D, ζp). As noted in [5]
and explained in more detail in [6], this requires (log |∆|)O(1) bits of storage, where
∆ is the discriminant of Q(
√
D, ζp). Unfortunately, it is not hard to show that
∆ = Dp−1p2p−4 if p does not divide D or Dp−1pp−3 if p does divide D (but
p 6= D). (See [19], for instance.) Thus the Z-basis requires (p logD)O(1) bits of
storage. Furthermore, as explained in [11], an ideal class should be represented by
a member of the class which is LLL-reduced; that is, by one which corresponds
to an LLL-reduced lattice under Minkowski’s embedding. Such an representation
requires (n + log |∆|)O(1) bits of storage, where n is the degree of the field and ∆
is as before. (See [6] and [4] for details.) In our case n = p − 1 (assuming p 6= D)
so this again requires (p logD)O(1) bits of storage. Of course, this means that the
time it takes to carry out the basic algorithms for the class group is also generally
going to be exponential in the size of p. Whether this situation is bad enough to
preclude the use of our fields is not yet clear.
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6. Conclusion and Future Work
Much of the future work described in [14] still remains to be done; in particular
many improvements could be made in the implementations of the algorithms and
perhaps in the algorithms themselves. However, the results already seem encour-
aging. With a faster implementation, the use of the search algorithm of Section 2
to find class groups large enough for secure cryptography seems quite feasible, al-
though this should be tested in practice. More importantly, an implementation
of one or more cryptographic protocols needs to be done using the class groups
we have described in order to determine whether secure cryptography can be done
sufficiently quickly in these groups.
The data collected in Section 4 is also encouraging, but clearly more is necessary.
The author hopes to implement and run his algorithms on a true supercomputer in
the near future. The data produced by this will undoubtably give a clearer picture
of the phenomena so far observed, perhaps leading to refinements of our hypotheses.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Don Burdick of the Institute of Statistics and
Decision Sciences at Duke University for his help in making sense of the data
presented in Sections 3 and 4. He would also like to thank Carl Pomerance for
suggesting that this data was worthy of presenting to a statistician in the first
place.
References
[1] Eric Bach, The complexity of number-theoretic constants, Inform. Process. Lett. 62 (1997),
145–152.
[2] C. Batut, K. Belabas, D. Bernardi, H. Cohen, and M. Olivier, User’s guide to
PARI-GP, Laboratoire A2X, Universite´ Bordeaux I, version 2.0.9 ed., May 13, 1998,
<http://www.parigp-home.de>, <ftp://megrez.math.u-bordeaux.fr>.
[3] Ingrid Biehl, Johannes Buchmann, Safuat Hamdy, and Andreas Meyer, A
signature scheme based on the intractability of extracting roots, Tech. Re-
port Technical Report No. TI-1/00, Darmstadt University of Technology, 2000,
<http://www.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de/TI/Mitarbeiter/amy/Welcome.html>.
[4] Johannes Buchmann and Volker Kessler, Computing a reduced lattice basis from a generat-
ing system, <http://www.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de/TI/Veroeffentlichung/reports/>,
1992.
[5] Johannes Buchmann and Sachar Paulus, A one way function based on ideal arithmetic in
number fields, Advances in cryptology—CRYPTO ’97 (Burton S. Kaliski, Jr, ed.), Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1294, Springer-Verlag, 1997, pp. 385–394.
[6] Johannes Buchmann and Oliver van Sprang, On short representations of orders and number
fields, <http://www.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de/TI/Veroeffentlichung/reports/>, 1992.
[7] J. Buhler, R. Crandall, R. Ernvall, and T. Metsa¨nkyla¨, Irregular primes and cyclotomic
invariants up to four million, Math. Comp. 59 (1992), 717–722.
[8] J. P. Buhler, R. E. Crandall, and R. W. Sompolski, Irregular primes to one million, Math.
Comp. 59 (1992), 717–722.
[9] J. W. S. Cassels and A. Fro¨hlich (eds.), Algebraic number theory, Academic Press, 1986,
Reprint of the 1967 original.
[10] Sandra Fillebrown, Faster computation of Bernoulli numbers, J. Algorithms 13 (1992), 431–
445.
[11] Tobias Hahn, Andreas Meyer, Stefan Neis, and Thomas Pfahler, Implement-
ing cryptographic protocols based on algebraic number fields, Tech. Report
Technical Report No. TI-24/99, Darmstadt University of Technology, 1999,
<http://www.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de/TI/Mitarbeiter/amy/Welcome.html>.
FIRST-HIT ANALYSIS OF ALGORITHMS FOR COMPUTING QUADRATIC IRREGULARITY9
[12] Joshua Holden, Irregularity of prime numbers over real quadratic fields, Algorithmic Number
Theory: Third International Symposium; Proceedings (J. P. Buhler, ed.), Springer Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1423, Springer-Verlag, 1998, pp. 454–462.
[13] , On the Fontaine-Mazur Conjecture for number fields and an analogue for function
fields, J. Number Theory 81 (2000), 16–47.
[14] , Comparison of algorithms to calculate quadratic irregularity of prime numbers,
Math. Comp. (To appear).
[15] Wells Johnson, Irregular primes and cyclotomic invariants, Math. Comp. 29 (1975), 113–120.
[16] D. H. Lehmer, Automation and pure mathematics, Applications of Digital Computers (Wal-
ter F. Freiberger and William Prager, eds.), Ginn and Company, Boston, 1963, pp. 219–231.
[17] Carl Ludwig Siegel, Zu zwei bemerkungen Kummers, Nachr. Akad. Wiss. Go¨ttingen Math.-
Phys. Kl. II 6 (1964), 51–57.
[18] Samuel S. Wagstaff, Jr., The irregular primes to 125000, Math. Comp. 32 (1978), 583–591.
[19] Lawrence C. Washington, Introduction to cyclotomic fields, second ed., Graduate Texts in
Mathematics, vol. 83, Springer-Verlag, 1997.
[20] K. Wooldridge, Some results in arithmetical functions similar to euler’s phi-function, Ph.D.
thesis, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1975.
Department of Mathematics, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708, USA
E-mail address: holden@math.duke.edu
URL: http://www.math.duke.edu/~holden
